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## Off

Their rhetoric of peaceful cooperation is mere Bush-style whitewashing of mass violence

Porotsky 13 (Sophia Porotsky, MA honors candidate in international relations at the University of St Andrews, April 26th, 2013, “Pax Americana: The Successful Securitization of the Triple Threat of Terrorism, “Outlaw” Regimes, and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” http://www.academia.edu/3482477/Pax\_Americana\_The\_Successful\_Securitization\_of\_the\_Triple\_Threat\_of\_Terrorism\_Outlaw\_Regimes\_and\_Weapons\_of\_Mass\_Destruction) gz

Transforming the semantics of an act involves “replacing unpleasant reality with desirable rhetoric, gilding the frame so that the real picture is disguised” (Zimbardo, 2009: 273). The use of sanitizing or euphemistic language is ubiquitous in the government texts. For example, Bush declares: ¶ “We will use our position of unparalleled strength and influence to build an atmosphere of international order and openness in which progress and liberty can flourish in many nations. A peaceful world of growing freedom serves American long-term interests, reflects enduring American ideals, and unites America’s allies. We defend this peace by opposing and preventing violence by terrorists and outlaw regimes” (Bush, 2002d).¶ In this excerpt Bush cloaks military action with euphemistic statements such as ‘building an atmosphere of international order and openness’ and ‘defending the peace,’ he sanitizes the means by accentuating the morally justifiable ends of ‘peace’, ‘order’, and ‘openness’. Tapping into the political myth of American Exceptionalism, Bush justifies the end goal by framing it as a cause for the greater good of the world. Bandura expands on the effects of sanitizing language and euphemistic labeling stating:¶ “Language shapes thought patterns on which actions are based. Activities can take on very different appearances depending on what they are called…euphemistic language is widely used to make harmful conduct respectable and to reduce personal responsibility for it…people behave much more cruelly when assaultive actions are verbally sanitized than when they are called aggression” (Bandura, 1999: 195). ¶ This statement substantiates the claim that adopting a particular discourse when describing violent action disguises the true meaning of the act, while simultaneously reinforcing the justifications from the War on Terrorism narrative. A further example can be found in Bush’s Address to the Nation where he asserts:¶ “These carefully targeted actions are designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations…Our military action is also designed to clear the way for sustained, comprehensive and relentless operations to drive them out and bring them to justice…As we strike military targets, we’ll also drop food, medicine and supplies to the starving and suffering men and women and children of Afghanistan” (Bush, 2001k).¶ Describing military actions as ‘carefully targeted’ implies that the army is striking only military targets with surgical precision; it encourages people to overlook any ‘collateral damage,’ a euphemism for civilian casualties, in the process. Additionally, Bush excuses the implicit collateral damage by demonstrating the benevolence of the United States. Dropping humanitarian aid compensates for the consequences of military action. Bush then reinforces the benevolent image of the United States by tapping into discourses of women and children and suffering, assigning the role of savior of the Afghan people to the United States. The altered semantics of this act is revealed upon a comparison of the reality on the ground versus the narrative Bush was constructing. While Bush claimed that the military campaign in Afghanistan was ‘carefully targeted’ and ‘precise,’ in reality the military was carpet bombing Afghanistan using cluster bombs (Lee, 2005: 279). Carpet bombing can be understood as “the progressive distribution of a mass bomb load upon an area…in such a manner as to inflict damage to all portions within the boundaries” (Keane, 2005: 30). Thus, carpet bombing by definition is indiscriminate, the polar opposite of ‘carefully targeted’ or ‘precise.’ Moreover, cluster bombs “disperse large numbers of explosive submunitions over wide areas and often fail to explode immediately, leaving a long-term legacy of explosive contamination” (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2009). Cluster bombs in particular have provoked international criticism due to their “unique characteristics that make them a grave danger to civilian men, women and children… causing high civilian casualties especially when they are used in populated areas… Many thousands of civilians have been tragically killed and injured by coming into contact with unexploded submunitions” (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2009). Thus, the narrative Bush was constructing could not be further from the reality. While Bush was highlighting the benevolence and good will of the US, the US military was inflicting the maximum amount of indiscriminate damage. Ironically, the humanitarian aid packages Bush was referring to were the same bright yellow color as the unexploded cluster bomblets (Lee, 2005: 279), further endangering civilians who could easily mistake the submunitions for food or medicine. Bush obscuring the sordid realities and stressing the good will of the US contributes to moral justification, which is essential for the American public acceptance of securitization. Moral justifications are a requisite of moral disengagement, since these justifications are the basis on which morally reprehensible acts are perpetrated.

This manifests itself in a drive for certainty which causes endless violence

Burke, 7 (Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales at Sydney, Anthony, Johns Hopkins University Press, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, Project Muse)

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being. This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21 What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action. The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state. This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror' Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth. However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped? How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political.

The alternative is to deterritorialize the 1AC through a historical and critical lens – rather than objectively approaching their threat discourse, we choose more diverse forms of analysis

Krause and Williams 97 (Keith Krause, professor of political science at the Graduate Institute on International and Development Studies, Michael C Williams, professor of international relations at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, “From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies,” chapter 2 of Critical Security Studies, p 49-50)

The challenges to the conventional understanding of security and the object to be secured also necessitate an epistemological shift in the way security is to be understood and studied. What is involved is a shift in focus from abstract individualism and contractual sovereignty to a stress on culture, civilization, and identity; the role of ideas, norms, and values in the constitution of that which is to be secured; and the historical context within which this process takes place. Epistemologically, this involves moving away from the objectivist, rationalist approach of both neorealism and neoliberalism, and toward more interpretive modes of analysis. While these issues have gained some prominence in debates over the nature of regime theory and the study of international organizations, they have made little impact on security studies.51 This is clearly illustrated by Helga Haftendorn’s attempts to broaden the ambit of security studies. On method, she concludes that the goal of security studies is “to construct an empirically testable paradigm,” which involves defining the “set of observational hypotheses,” the “hard core of irrefutable assumptions,” and the “‘set of scope conditions’ that…are required for a ‘progressive’ research program.” Although she admits that “we might do well to follow [Robert] Keohane’s counsel to apply somewhat ‘softer,’ more interpretive standards,” there is little room in this approach for studying norm change and the role of ideational elements in *constituting* the historical context within which actors take specific decisions.52 Despite Haftendorn’s goal of incorporating new issues that are normatively driven, the subordination of normative and reflexive conceptions of agency to objectivist visions of method remains largely undisturbed, and she remains committed to the fact value distinction. To understand security from a broader perspective means to look at the ways in which the objects to be secured, the perceptions of threats to them, and the available means of securing them (both intellectual and material) have shifted over time.53 New threats emerge; new enemies are created; erstwhile fellow citizens become objects of hatred and violence; former enemies can be transformed into members of the same community. The status of Others is uncertain, needing to be deciphered and determined.54 To comprehend these processes requires an understanding of the problematics of security as constituted by self-reflexive historical practices. The knightly code of honor, for example, was both a central structuring practice of latemedieval conflict and a central object that was to be secured. Honor was an integral part of conflict in its genesis as well as its practice. To view the military conflict of the late-medieval world as a competition between instrumentally rational actors in the modern sense is to misunderstand it in both form and content.55 The shift to interpretive models of understanding (broadly conceived) also yields a different vision of the transformation of practices. As historically grounded, the practices of security become capable of conscious transformation through the process of critical reflection. No longer objective in the sense of a fixed reality that the analyst can only mirror, reality as the realm of subjective practices and structures becomes self-reflexive. This is most emphatically not to say that security studies needs to move away from studying the role of ideas, institutions, and instruments of organized violence in political life. In this respect, the continuing defenders of traditional strategic/security studies are correct (although this formulation will probably leave them uncomfortable). But if we are to understand these realities, we must take them more seriously than the abstractions of neorealism allow. We must grasp the genesis and structure of particular security problems as grounded in concrete historical conditions and practices, rather than in abstract assertions of transcendental rational actors and scientific methods. We must understand the genesis of conflicts and the creation of the dilemmas of security as grounded in reflexive practices rather than as the outcome of timeless structures.56

## Off

A. Interpretation – engagement is a strategy depending on positive incentives which seeks to shape the behavior of a target country

Haass & O’Sullivan, 2000 – \*Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution AND \*Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, (Richard N & Meghan L., “Terms of engagement: alternatives to punitive policies,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 42, No. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 113–35, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1093/survival/42.2.113#preview)

The term ‘engagement’ was popularised in the early 1980s amid controversy about the Reagan administration’s policy of ‘constructive engagement’ towards South Africa. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. Except in the few instances where the US has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably ‘engages’ states and actors all the time simply by interacting with them. To be a meaningful subject of analysis, the term ‘engagement’ must refer to something more specific than a policy of ‘non-isolation’. As used in this article, ‘engagement’ refers to a foreign-policy strategy which depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives. Certainly, it does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign-policy instruments such as sanctions or military force: in practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the distinguishing feature of American engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behaviour of countries with which the US has important disagreements.

That means the plan must be a quid-pro-quo

De LaHunt, 6 – Assistant Director for Environmental Health & Safety Services in Colorado College's Facilities Services department (John, “Perverse and unintended” Journal of Chemical Health and Safety, July-August, Science Direct)

Incentives work on a quid pro quo basis – this for that. If you change your behavior, I’ll give you a reward. One could say that coercion is an incentive program – do as I say and I’ll let you live. However, I define an incentive as getting something you didn’t have before in exchange for new behavior, so that pretty much puts coercion in its own box, one separate from incentives. But fundamental problems plague the incentive approach. Like coercion, incentives are poor motivators in the long run, for at least two reasons – unintended consequences and perverse incentives.

## Oil Spills

**No risk of a spill – safety coop now, emergency authority and there is so little recoverable oil there won’t be much drilling**

Cardenas, 12 – former senior official at the U.S. State Department (Jose, “The phony Cuba embargo debate”, Foreign Policy, March 21, 2012, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/21/the\_phony\_cuba\_embargo\_debate)//eek

In recent weeks, an unholy alliance of political activists and economic opportunists have been trying to convince anyone who will listen that the U.S. embargo of Cuba is inviting "catastrophic" damage to Florida by preventing the U.S. from responding to a potential oil spill from a newly launched Cuban rig just outside U.S. waters. The claim is without merit. The impetus for this contrived argument is that in late January, the Spanish oil company Repsol began exploratory drilling in Cuban waters -- 80 nautical miles from the Florida Keys -- using a Chinese-made rig owned by an Italian company. The fact is, under current U.S. policy, any U.S. President has broad authorities to ensure all U.S. resources and expertise can be deployed in case of a disaster off the southeastern U.S. coast. And all indications are the administration has moved expeditiously -- with lessons learned from the Deepwater Horizon blowout in the Gulf of Mexico -- to plan a U.S. response -- with no changes needed in U.S. law. Yet, that has not stopped the doomsday scenarios. For example, according to one alarmist analysis, in case of an accident: "The Coast Guard would be barred from deploying highly experienced manpower, specially designed booms, skimming equipment and vessels, and dispersants. U.S. offshore gas and oil companies would also be barred from using well-capping stacks, remotely operated submersibles, and other vital technologies." The arguments, frankly, are a hash of half-truths and erroneous and contradictory statements about the U.S. embargo. For example, we are told the U.S. embargo prevents interaction between the U.S. and Cuban officials to discuss response scenarios, only to learn that they already are interacting. Meetings between U.S. and Cuban officials (and those from Bahamas, Jamaica, and Mexico) have already taken place under the auspices of the U.N. International Maritime Organization. Then there is the ludicrous scenario posited of vintage Cuban crop dusters being forced into action because the embargo allegedly would prevent U.S. aircraft from dropping oil dispersants. Nonsense. In addition, there is the de rigueur clumsy caricature of pro-embargo Cuban Americans, who "might protest any decision allowing U.S. federal agencies to assist Cuba or letting U.S. companies operate in Cuban territory." This seems not to be aware that most Cuban Americans live in South Florida and would have a decided interest in any despoiling of the state's environment. They would hardly be averse to any U.S. mobilization to counter a spill. What they do justifiably object to is any exploitation of the situation for political ends. Indeed, a particularly egregious example of the politicization of the issue has been the involvement of the Environmental Defense Fund, which has been positively sanguine about Cuban oil drilling. A powerful lobby able to mobilize hundreds of activists to oppose U.S. offshore drilling, they have been leading advocates of across-the-board U.S. cooperation with Cuba on offshore oil drilling, despite the latter's woeful inexperience and dearth of capabilities in offshore oil drilling. In this, they have been aided and abetted by assorted U.S. oil services companies who have been misrepresenting U.S. policy in a misguided attempt to create economic opportunity. In the end, the likelihood that Cuba possesses any commercially viable oil reserves off its shores is dubious. And, in the unlikely event that it does discover any, it's probable that they will be exploitable only after the Castro regime passes into the dustbin of history. In the meantime, however, allowing Cuba anywhere near a deepwater platform is akin to handing a hand-grenade to a monkey. The Obama administration could have done better by strong-arming foreign companies from partnering with the Castro brothers on this project. But they appear to have a handle on cleaning up any attendant mess -- without any superfluous changes to U.S. policy towards the Castro dictatorship.

Turn – normalizing trade relations with Cuba leads to massive increase in investment and tourism, devastating the unique ecological environment

Dean, 7 - science writer for the New York Times, taught seminars and courses at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism and Vassar College, and the University of Rhode Island, member of the Corporation of Brown University, a founding member of the advisory board of the Metcalf Institute for Marine and Environmental Reporting (Cornelia, “Published: Conserving Cuba, After the Embargo”, December 25, 2007 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/25/science/25cuba.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=1&)//ah

Through accidents of geography and history, **Cuba is a priceless ecological resource**. That is why many scientists are so worried about what will become of it after Fidel Castro and his associates leave power and, as is widely anticipated, the American government relaxes or ends its trade embargo. The New York Times Cuba has **avoided much environmental degradation in recent decades,** but now hotel developments are seen extending into the water in Cayo Coco. More Photos > Cuba, by far the region’s largest island, sits at the confluence of the Atlantic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. Its mountains, forests, swamps, coasts and marine areas are rich in plants and animals, **some seen nowhere else.** And since the imposition of the embargo in 1962, and especially with the collapse in 1991 of the Soviet Union, its major economic patron, Cuba’s economy has stagnated. Cuba has not been free of development, includig Soviet-style top-down agricultural and mining operations and, in recent years, an expansion of tourism. But it also has an abundance of landscapes that elsewhere in the region have been ripped up, paved over, poisoned or otherwise destroyed in the decades since the Cuban revolution, when development has been most intense. Once the embargo ends, the island could face a flood of investors from the United States and elsewhere, **eager to exploit those landscapes.** Conservationists, environmental lawyers and other experts, from Cuba and elsewhere, met last month in Cancún, Mexico, to discuss the island’s resources and how to continue to protect them. Cuba has done “what we should have done — identify your hot spots of biodiversity and set them aside,” said Oliver Houck, a professor of environmental law at Tulane University Law School who attended the conference. In the late 1990s, Mr. Houck was involved in an effort, financed in part by the MacArthur Foundation, to advise Cuban officials writing new environmental laws. But, he said in an interview, **“an invasion of U.S. consumerism, a U.S.-dominated future, could roll over it like a bulldozer” when the embargo ends.** By some estimates, tourism in Cuba is increasing 10 percent annually. At a minimum, Orlando Rey Santos, the Cuban lawyer who led the law-writing effort, said in an interview at the conference, “we can guess that tourism is going to increase in a very fast way” when the embargo ends. “It is estimated we could double tourism in one year,” said Mr. Rey, who heads environmental efforts at the Cuban ministry of science, technology and environment. About 700 miles long and about 100 miles wide at its widest, Cuba runs from Haiti west almost to the Yucatán Peninsula of Mexico. It offers crucial habitat for birds, like Bicknell’s thrush, whose summer home is in the mountains of New England and Canada, and the North American warblers that stop in Cuba on their way south for the winter. Zapata Swamp, on the island’s southern coast, may be notorious for its mosquitoes, but it is also known for its fish, amphibians, birds and other creatures. Among them is the Cuban crocodile, which has retreated to Cuba from a range that once ran from the Cayman Islands to the Bahamas. Cuba has the most biologically diverse populations of freshwater fish in the region. Its relatively large underwater coastal shelves are crucial for numerous marine species, including some whose larvae can be carried by currents into waters of the United States, said Ken Lindeman, a marine biologist at Florida Institute of Technology. Dr. Lindeman, who did not attend the conference but who has spent many years studying Cuba’s marine ecology, said in an interview that some of these creatures were important commercial and recreational species like the spiny lobster, grouper or snapper. Like corals elsewhere, those in Cuba are suffering as global warming raises ocean temperatures and acidity levels. And like other corals in the region, they reeled when a mysterious die-off of sea urchins left them with algae overgrowth. But they have largely escaped damage from pollution, boat traffic and destructive fishing practices. Diving in them “is like going back in time 50 years,” said David Guggenheim, a conference organizer and an ecologist and member of the advisory board of the Harte Research Institute, which helped organize the meeting along with the Center for International Policy, a private group in Washington. In a report last year, the World Wildlife Fund said that “in dramatic contrast” to its island neighbors, Cuba’s beaches, mangroves, reefs, seagrass beds and other habitats were relatively well preserved. **Their biggest threat**, the report said, was “th**e prospect of sudden and massive growth in mass tourism when the U.S. embargo lifts.”**

Environmental apocalypticism causes eco-authoritarianism and mass violence against those deemed environmental threats – also causes political apathy which turns case

Buell 3 (Frederick Buell, cultural critic on the environmental crisis and a Professor of English at Queens College and the author of five books; “From Apocalypse To Way of Life,” pg. 185-186)

Looked at critically, then, **crisis discourse** thus suffers from a number of liabilities. First, it seems to have become a **political liability** almost as much as an asset. It calls up a **fierce and effective opposition** with its predictions; worse, its more specific predictions are all too **vulnerable to refutation by events**. It also **exposes environmentalists to being called grim doomsters** and antilife Puritan extremists. Further, concern with crisis has all too often tempted people to try to find a “**total solution**” to the problems involved— a phrase that, as an astute analyst of the limitations of crisis discourse, John Barry, puts it, is all too reminiscent of the Third Reich’s infamous “**final solution**.”55 A total crisis of society—environmental crisis at its gravest—threatens to translate despair into **inhumanist authoritarianism**; more often, however, it helps keep merely dysfunctional authority in place. It thus leads, Barry suggests, to the belief that only elite- and expert-led solutions are possible.56 At the same timeit **depoliticizes people**, inducing them to accept their impotence as individuals; this is something that has made many people today feel, ironically and/or passively, that since it makes no difference at all what any individual does on his or her own, one might as well go along with it. Yet another pitfall for the full and sustained elaboration of environmental crisis is, though least discussed, perhaps the most deeply ironic. A problem with deep cultural and psychological as well as social effects, it is embodied in a startlingly simple proposition: the worse one feels environmental crisis is, the more one is tempted to turn one’s back on the environment. This means, preeminently, turning one’s back on “nature”—on traditions of nature feeling, traditions of knowledge about nature (ones that range from organic farming techniques to the different departments of ecological science), and traditions of nature-based activism. If nature is thoroughly wrecked these days, **people need to delink from nature** and live in postnature—a conclusion that, as the next chapter shows, many in U.S. society drew at the end of the millenium. Explorations of how deeply “nature” has been wounded and how intensely vulnerable to and dependent on human actions it is can thus lead, ironically, to **further indifference** to nature-based environmental issues, not greater concern with them. But what quickly becomes evident to any reflective consideration of the difficulties of crisis discourse is that all of these liabilities are in fact bound tightly up with one specific notion of environmental crisis—with 1960s- and 1970s-style environmental apocalypticism. Excessive concern about them does not recognize that crisis discourse as a whole has significantly changed since the 1970s. They remain inducements to look away from serious reflection on environmental crisis only if one does not explore how environmental crisis has turned of late from apocalypse to dwelling place. The apocalyptic mode had a number of prominent features: it was preoccupied with running out and running into walls; with scarcity and with the imminent rupture of limits; with actions that promised and temporally predicted imminent total meltdown; and with (often, though not always) the need for immediate “**total solution**.” **Thus doomsterism was its reigning mode; eco-authoritarianism** was a grave temptation; and as crisis was elaborated to show more and more severe deformations of nature, temptation increased to refute it, or give up, or even cut off ties to clearly terminal “nature.”

**No extinction**

Malcolm **Gladwell**, writer for The New Yorker and best-selling author The New Republic, July 17 and 24, 19**95**, excerpted in Epidemics: Opposing Viewpoints, 1999, p. 31-32

Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adapt a specific strategy but every strategy carries a corresponding cost and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly but it relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all hut halt endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability its essential rigidity is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. AIDS is almost invariably lethal because it attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. Viruses are not superhuman. I could go on, but the point is obvious. Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once: as contagious as flue, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation that it would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not, well, superhuman. They cannot do everything at once. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of human beings, but they neglect to point out the limitations of microscopic life forms.

The fear of disease securitizes the alien body of the infected – justifies ethnic cleansing in pursuit of the “perfect human”

Gomel 2000(Elana Gomel, English department head at Tel Aviv University, Winter 2000, published in Twentieth Century Literature Volume 46, <http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0403/is_4_46/ai_75141042>)

In the secular apocalyptic visions that have proliferated wildly in the last 200 years, the world has been destroyed by nuclear wars, alien invasions, climatic changes, social upheavals, meteor strikes, and technological shutdowns. These baroque scenarios are shaped by the eroticism of disaster. The apocalyptic desire that finds satisfaction in elaborating fictions of the End is double-edged. On the one hand, its ultimate object is some version of the crystalline New Jerusalem, an image of purity so absolute that it denies the organic messiness of life. [1] On the other hand, apocalyptic fictions typically linger on pain and suffering. The end result of apocalyptic purification often seems of less importance than the narrative pleasure derived from the bizarre and opulent tribulations of the bodies being burnt by fire and brimstone, tormented by scorpion stings, trodden like grapes in the winepress. In this interplay between the incorporeal purity of the ends and the violent corporeality of the means the apocalyptic body is born. It is a body whose mortal sickness is a precondition of ultimate health, whose grotesque and excessive sexuality issues in angelic sexlessness, and whose torture underpins a painless--and lifeless--millennium.The apocalyptic body is perverse, points out Tina Pippin, unstable and mutating from maleness to femaleness and back again, purified by the sadomasochistic "bloodletting on the cross," trembling in abject terror while awaiting an unearthly consummation (122). But most of all it is a suffering body, a text written in the script of stigmata, scars, wounds, and sores. Any apocalypse strikes the body politic like a disease, progressing from the first symptoms of a large-scale disaster through the crisis of the tribulation to the recovery of the millennium. But of all the Four Horsemen, the one whose ride begins most intimately, in the private travails of individual flesh, and ends in the devastation of the entire community, is the last one, Pestilence. The contagious body is the most characteristic modality of apocalyptic corporeality. At the same time, I will argue, it contains a counterapocalyptic potential, resisting the dangerous lure of Endism, the ideologically potent combination of "apocalyptic terror", a nd "millennial perfection" (Quinby 2). This essay, a brief sketch of the poetics and politics of the contagious body, does not attempt a comprehensive overview of the historical development of the trope of pestilence. Nor does it limit itself to a particular disease, along the lines of Susan Sontag's classic delineation of the poetics of TB and many subsequent attempts to develop a poetics of AIDS. Rather, my focus is on the general narrativity of contagion and on the way the plague-stricken body is manipulated within the overall plot of apocalyptic millennialism, which is a powerful ideological current in twentieth-century political history, embracing such diverse manifestations as religious fundamentalism, Nazism, and other forms of "radical desperation" (Quinby 4--5). Thus, I consider both real and imaginary diseases, focusing on the narrative construction of the contagious body rather than on the precise epidemiology of the contagion. All apocalyptic and millenarian ideologies ultimately converge on the utopian transformation of the body (and the body politic) through suffering. But pestilence offers a uniquely ambivalent modality of corporeal apocalypse. On the one hand, it may be appropriated to the standard plot of apocalyptic purification as a singularly atrocious technique of separating the damned from the saved. Thus, the plague becomes a metaphor for genocide, functioning as such both in Mein Kampf and in Camus's The Plague.[2] On the other hand, the experience of a pandemic undermines the giddy hopefulness of Endism. Since everybody is a potential victim, the line between the pure and the impure can never be drawn with any precision. Instead of delivering the climactic moment of the Last Judgment, pestilence lingers on, generating a limbo of common suffering in which a tenuous and moribund but all-embracing body politic springs into being. The end is indefinitely postponed and the disease becomes a metaphor for the process of livi ng. The finality of mortality clashes with the duration of morbidity. Pestilence is poised on the cusp between divine punishment and manmade disaster. On the one hand, unlike nuclear war or ecological catastrophe, pandemic has a venerable historical pedigree that leads back from current bestsellers such as Pierre Quellette's The Third Pandemic (1996) to the medieval horrors of the Black Death and indeed to the Book of Revelation itself. On the other hand, disease is one of the central tropes of biopolitics, shaping much of the twentieth-century discourse of power, domination, and the body. Contemporary plague narratives, including the burgeoning discourse of AIDS, are caught between two contrary textual impulses: acquiescence in a (super) natural judgment and political activism. Their impossible combination produces a clash of two distinct plot modalities. In his contemporary incarnations the Fourth Horseman vacillates between the voluptuous entropy of indiscriminate killing and the genocidal energy directed at specific categories of victims. As Richard Dellamora points out in his gloss on Derrida, apocalypse in general may be used "in order to validate violence done to others" while it may also function as a modality of total resistance to the existing order (3). But my concern here is not so much with the difference between "good" and "bad" apocalypses (is total extinction "better" than selective genocide?) as with the interplay of eschatology and politics in the construction of the apocalyptic body.

## OAS

**Litany of alt causes to cred**

Burgsdorff 9(Ph. D in Political Science from Freiburg University, EU Fellow at the University of Miami (Sven Kühn von, “Problems and Opportunities for the Incoming Obama Administration”, http://aei.pitt.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/11047/1/vonBurgsdorfUSvsCubalong09edi.pdf)//NG

As a matter of fact, together with other measures such as closing Guantanamo, signing up to the Kyoto Protocol and putting into practice the succeeding agreement under the Bali conference, and possibly, joining the International Criminal Court as well as ratifying further international human rights treaties such as the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child, it would be interpreted by the international community as steps towards effective multilateralism.

Economic engagement is an imperialist tool used to forward US geopolitical dominance – economic influence perpetuates the North/South geographical divide which makes war inevitable

Jones, Jones, and Woods, 4(Martin Jones\* - PhD in Human Geography from the University of Manchester, Rhys Jones; Professor of Human Geography at the University

of Wales Aberystwyth\*\* - Professor in Human Geography @ the University¶ of Wales Aberystwyth, Michael Woods\*\*\* - PhD in Human Geography from Bristol University; Professor of Human Geography and Director of the Institute of Geography and Earth Sciences @ the University¶ of Wales Aberystwyth, 2004, “AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY Space, place and politics”, http://118.97.161.124/perpus-fkip/Perpustakaan/Geography/Geografi%20manusia/Pengantar%20Geografi%20Politik.pdf) MD

Political domination can take on many forms. At¶ its most basic and uncompromising, it is based on¶ military relationships between two or more parties.¶ Much of the rationale behind the proliferation of¶ nuclear weapons during the Cold War, for instance,¶ was based upon the West and the East’s need to secure¶ strategic military and, therefore, political advantage¶ over their enemies. This became the main justiﬁcation¶ for the global political and military face-off between¶ East and West that characterised the international¶ relations of the Cold War. A more recent example has been the nuclear stand-off between India and Pakistan¶ over the disputed province of Kashmir (Dodds 2000:¶ 103–6). Once again, overt displays of the military¶ might of the two countries have been used as a means¶ of securing strategic, military and political advantage¶ within the region. Political forms of geopolitical¶ domination can also occur in more subtle and hidden¶ ways. A good instance of this is the persistent military¶ inﬂuence of the United States in neighbouring countries in the Caribbean, Central and South America ¶ (see Dodds 2000: 57). The most infamous examples ¶ of these more covert efforts by the United States to¶ influence the internal politics of other independent¶ states have been in Guatemala, Nicaragua and **Cuba**.¶ These latter examples also begin to demonstrate the¶ strong connections between political and economic¶ aspects of geopolitical strategy, where political interference is accompanied by various forms of **financial**¶ **aid**. A key method of securing geopolitical inﬂuence¶ and dominance in recent years has been the ﬁnancial¶ and technological aid offered by dominant countries to¶ other, needy countries. In many ways, if military might represents the ‘stick’ of international relations, then¶ ﬁnancial aid is the ‘carrot’. Numerous examples exist¶ to demonstrate the role of economic influence in¶ shaping international geopolitical relations. In the¶ period after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, for¶ instance, there was much debate in the international¶ community concerning the best way to secure the¶ freedom of the latter. Much of the political shenanigans¶ of the period took place in the corridors of the United¶ Nations in New York. The famous journalist John¶ Pilger (1992) has noted how the United States tried¶ to use its economic muscle as a way of securing the¶ support of other states for its plan to mount an invasion¶ of Kuwait and Iraq. In this respect, its main efforts were¶ directed towards the non-permanent members of the¶ Security Council of the United Nations, which, at that¶ time, included one of the poorest states in the world,¶ Yemen. It is a little-known fact that Yemen voted not¶ to support an invasion of the Middle East by American led UN forces. In the immediate aftermath of the vote,¶ it is alleged by Pilger (1992), the Yemeni ambassador¶ to the United Nations was informed by his US counterpart that that was the most costly decision he¶ had ever made. In the following weeks, $70 million of¶ proposed US aid to Yemen was cancelled, the World¶ Bank and the International Monetary Fund began to¶ question the economic practices of the Yemeni state¶ and 800,000 Yemeni workers were expelled from Saudi¶ Arabia. As Dodds (2000) has argued, occurrences such as¶ these are part of a broader range of economic strategies¶ that help certain Northern states to achieve geopolitical¶ dominance over Southern countries. The influence ¶ of industrialised countries over institutions such as ¶ the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and ¶ the World Trade Organisation has been particularly¶ important. It has helped to generate an additional ¶ layer of compliance within international relations. The¶ best example of this process is the so-called ‘structural¶ adjustment programmes’ of the World Bank, which¶ seek to constrain the range of economic and political¶ policies that can be pursued by less industrialised¶ countries (Dodds 2000: 17; see also Krasner 2001:¶ 28–9). The criticism levelled at these programmes is¶ that they reify a particularly industrialised model of¶ development on southern states and, as such, represent¶ **a new form of informal imperialism by northern states.¶** In many ways, these examples illustrate the strong¶ connections between geopolitics and the broader international political economy (see Agnew and Corbridge¶ 1995).¶

**China doesn’t pose a security threat to the US**

**Zenko and Cohen 12** (Micah Zenko, Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, and MIchael Cohen, Senior Fellow at the American Security Project, serves on the board of the National Security Network and has taught at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs, served in the U.S. Department of State, former Senior Vice President at the strategic communications firm of Robinson, Lerer and Montgomery, bachelor’s degree in international relations from American University and a master’s degree from Columbia University, 3/14/2012, "Clear and Present Safety", yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/clear-and-present-safety)

As the threat from transnational terrorist groups dwindles, the United States also faces few risks from other states. China is the most obvious potential rival to the United States, and there is little doubt that China’s rise will pose a challenge to U.S. economic interests. Moreover, there is an unresolved debate among Chinese political and military leaders about China’s proper global role, and the lack of transparency from China’s senior leadership about its long-term foreign policy objectives is a cause for concern. However, the present security threat to the U.S. mainland is practically nonexistent and will remain so. Even as China tries to modernize its military, its defense spending is still approximately one-ninth that of the United States. In 2012, the Pentagon will spend roughly as much on military research and development alone as China will spend on its entire military. While China clumsily flexes its muscles in the Far East by threatening to deny access to disputed maritime resources, a recent Pentagon report noted that China’s military ambitions remain dominated by “regional contingencies” and that the People’s Liberation Army has made little progress in developing capabilities that “extend global reach or power projection.” In the coming years, China will enlarge its regional role, but this growth will only threaten U.S. interests if Washington attempts to dominate East Asia and fails to consider China’s legitimate regional interests. It is true that China’s neighbors sometimes fear that China will not resolve its disputes peacefully, but this has compelled Asian countries to cooperate with the United States, maintaining bilateral alliances that together form a strong security architecture and limit China’s room to maneuver. The strongest arguments made by those warning of Chinese influence revolve around economic policy. The list of complaints includes a host of Chinese policies, from intellectual property theft and currency manipulation to economic espionage and domestic subsidies. Yet none of those is likely to lead to direct conflict with the United States beyond the competition inherent in international trade, which does not produce zero-sum outcomes and is constrained by dispute-resolution mechanisms, such as those of the World Trade Organization. If anything, China’s export-driven economic strategy, along with its large reserves of U.S. Treasury bonds, suggests that Beijing will continue to prefer a strong United States to a weak one.

China’s not a threat

Jiang, 7 – Deputy Director of the Institute of Latin American Studies (ILAS) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Shixue, “Three Factors in Recent Development of Sino-Latin American Relations,” in ENTER THE DRAGON? China’s Presence in Latin America, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf, JMP)

THE U.S. FACTOR IN SINO-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS A closer relationship between China and Latin America has caused concern in the United States. At a hearing of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee on April 6, 2005, U.S. Congressman Dan Burton (R-IN) said, “The traditional goals of U.S. policy in Latin America have always included promoting political stability, promoting democracy, increasing access to markets, and preventing the rise of hegemonic power. Until we know the definitive answer to this question of whether China will play by the rules of fair trade and engage responsibly on transnational issues, I believe we should be cautious and view the rise of Chinese power as something to be counterbalanced or contained, and perhaps go so far as to consider China’s actions in Latin America as the movement of a hegemonic power into our hemisphere.”4 Burton mistakenly considered the development of Sino-Latin American relations as a danger to the United States. He said at the hearing, “I believe China’s rising economic, political and military influence in the Western hemisphere poses serious challenges to the United States in the years ahead. And if we are not careful, Beijing’s influence could easily unravel the region’s hard-won, U.S.-backed reforms to fight against corruption, human rights abuses, increase government transparency and combat intellectual property violations, and the democracies that we see as fledgling democracies could be in real jeopardy. We must work in earnest to prevent this from happening.” At the hearing, the U.S. Congressman even said, “I would also caution our friends throughout Latin America about granting China full market economy status. I think it is clear that China’s state subsidies, its currency peg, and poor labor rights conditions disqualify China from truly deserving ‘market economy status.’ Consequently, granting China full market economy status would be, in my view, a grave error in judgment.” The news media in the United Sates have been portraying a wrong perception of the development of Chinese relations with Latin America. One editorial in the Wall Street Journal, for instance, says, “The rise of China in the region could complicate U.S. efforts to control illegal immigration, weapons shipments, the drug trade and money laundering because China is cooperating with Latin countries that are not especially friendly toward those efforts. Some of these nations may try to use the Chinese alternative to challenge U.S. hegemony.”5 The United States’ concern over the closer relationship between China and Latin America is misplaced and unnecessary. It is well-known that Latin America has been on the path of reform and opening to the outside world for almost two decades. It endeavors to attract more foreign investment and liberalize the market so as to stimulate growth. As a result, China is only one of the economic partners with whom Latin America has been trying to cooperate. China understands well that Latin America is the backyard of the United States, so China has no intention whatsoever to challenge the American hegemony in Latin America. Both China and Latin America have been opening to the outside world. In the age of globalization both of them should cooperate to push forward South-South cooperation. As a matter of fact, further cooperation between China and Latin America will benefit regional peace and development in the Asia-Pacific region and in Latin America. Such an outcome would also certainly favor of the United States.

No China war

Goldstein 11 - Professor and Director of the China Maritime Studies Institute @ US Naval War College [Dr. Lyle J. Goldstein, “Resetting the US–China Security Relationship,” Survival | vol. 53 no. 2 | April–May 2011 | pp. 89–116

Weighed in the aggregate, China’s rise remains a peaceful process, and the record to date should engender significant confidence. Beijing has not resorted to a significant use of force against another state in more than three decades. Its deployments of troops as UN peacekeepers to hot spots such as Lebanon and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have played a helpful role, as have the counter-piracy operations of its fleet in the Gulf of Aden. When dealing with weak and occasionally unstable states on its borders, such as Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan, Beijing has not resorted to military intervention, nor even flexed its military muscles to gain advantage. Chinese maritime claims, whether in the South or the East China seas, are generally being enforced by unarmed patrol cutters, a clear signal that Beijing does not seek escalation to a major crisis on these matters. Contrary to the perception that China’s senior military officers are all irreconcilable hawks, one influential People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) admiral recently said in an interview, with reference to lessons learned from recent border negotiations on China’s periphery: ‘If there are never any concessions or compromises, there is simply no possibility of reaching a breakthrough in border negotiations.’2 pg. 90

Representations of China as a threat ignore the normative value-judgments inherent to the process of claiming to empirically know Chinese national and political identity—this makes security threats self-fulfilling prophecies

Pan, 4 – PhD in Political Science and International Relations and member of the International Studies Association ISA (Chengxin Pan: “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics”, Alternatives RC)

China and its relationship with the United States has long been a fascinating subject of study in the mainstream U.S. international relations community. This is reflected, for example, in the current heated debates over whether China is primarily a strategic threat to or a market bonanza for the United States and whether containment or engagement is the best way to deal with it. (1) While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China precisely is," their debates have been underpinned by some common ground, especially in terms of a positivist epistemology. Firstly, they believe that China is ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be, empirically revealed by scientific means**.** For example, after expressing his dissatisfaction with often conflicting Western perceptions of China, David M. Lampton, former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, suggests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world." (2) Like many other China scholars, Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment." (3) Secondly, associated with the first assumption, it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers" and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality. And thirdly, in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is." That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt. I do not dismiss altogether the conventional ways of debating China. It is not the purpose of this article to venture my own "observation" of "where China is today," nor to join the "containment" versus "engagement" debate per se. Rather, I want to contribute to a novel dimension of the China debate by questioning the seemingly unproblematic assumptions shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IR community in the United States. To perform this task, I will focus attention on a particularly significant component of the China debate; namely, the "China threat" literature. More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature--themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions. These themes are of course nothing new nor peculiar to the "China threat" literature. They have been identified elsewhere by critics of some conventional fields of study such as ethnography, anthropology, oriental studies, political science, and international relations. (4) Yet, so far, the China field in the West in general and the U.S. "China threat" literature in particular have shown remarkable resistance to systematic critical reflection on both their normative status as discursive practice and their enormous practical implications for international politics. (5) It is in this context that this article seeks to make a contribution. I begin with a brief survey of the "China threat" argument in contemporary U.S. international relations literature, followed by an investigation of how this particular argument about China is a discursive construction of other, which is predicated on the predominant way in which the United States imagines itself as the universal, indispensable nation-state in constant need of absolute certainty and security. Finally, this article will illustrate some of the dangerous practical consequences of the "China threat" discourse for contemporary U.S.-China relations, particularly with regard to the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident.

The spectral threat of nuclear war is itself part of a system of deterrence which neutralizes all events, including the real possibility of nuclear war. This is an implosive violence; the balance of terror is the terror of balance. That all things must be quilted through the nuclear issue marks its function as a simulacrum to conceal the death of politics

Baudrillard 81 (Jean Baudrillard, ask Jack, “Simulacra and Simulation,” pp 32-4)

The apotheosis of simulation: the nuclear. However, the balance of terror is never ¶ anything but the spectacular slope of a system of deterrence that has insinuated itself ¶ from the inside into all the cracks of daily life. Nuclear suspension only serves to seal the ¶ trivialized system of deterrence that is at the heart of the media, of the violence without ¶ consequences that reigns throughout the world, of the aleatory apparatus of all the ¶ choices that are made for us. The most insignificant of our behaviors is regulated by ¶ neutralized, indifferent, equivalent signs, by zero-sum signs like those that regulate the ¶ "strategy of games" (but the true equation is elsewhere, and the unknown is precisely that ¶ variable of simulation which makes of the atomic arsenal itself a hyperreal form, a ¶ simulacrum that dominates everything and reduces all "ground-level" events to being ¶ nothing but ephemeral scenarios, transforming the life left us into survival, into a stake ¶ without stakes - not even into a life insurance policy: into a policy that already has no ¶ value). ¶ It is not the direct threat of atomic destruction that paralyzes our lives, it is deterrence ¶ that gives them leukemia. And this deterrence comes from that fact that even the real ¶ atomic clash is precluded - precluded like the eventuality of the real in a system of signs. ¶ The whole world pretends to believe in the reality of this threat (this is understandable on ¶ the part of the military, the gravity of their exercise and the discourse of their "strategy" ¶ are at stake), but it is precisely at this level that there are no strategic stakes. The whole ¶ originality of the situation lies in the improbability of destruction.¶ Deterrence precludes war - the archaic violence of expanding systems. Deterrence itself ¶ is the neutral, implosive violence of metastable systems or systems in involution. There is ¶ no longer a subject of deterrence, nor an adversary nor a strategy - it is a planetary ¶ structure of the annihilation of stakes. Atomic war, like the Trojan War, will not take ¶ place. The risk of nuclear annihilation only serves as a pretext, through the sophistication ¶ of weapons (a sophistication that surpasses any possible objective to such an extent that it ¶ is itself a symptom of nullity), for installing a universal security system, a universal ¶ lockup and control system whose deterrent effect is not at all aimed at an atomic clash ¶ (which was never in question, except without a doubt in the very initial stages of the cold ¶ war, when one still confused the nuclear apparatus with conventional war) but, rather, at ¶ the much greater probability of any real event, of anything that would be an event in the ¶ general system and upset its balance. The balance of terror is the terror of balance.¶ Deterrence is not a strategy, it circulates and is exchanged between nuclear protagonists ¶ exactly as is international capital in the orbital zone of monetary speculation whose ¶ fluctuations suffice to control all global exchanges. Thus the money of destruction ¶ (without any reference to real destruction, any more than floating capital has a real ¶ referent of production) that circulates in nuclear orbit suffices to control all the violence ¶ and potential conflicts around the world.¶ What is hatched in the shadow of this mechanism with the pretext of a maximal, ¶ "objective," threat, and thanks to Damocles' nuclear sword, is the perfection of the best ¶ system of control that has ever existed. And the progressive satellization of the whole ¶ planet through this hypermodel of security.¶ The same goes for peaceful nuclear power stations. Pacification does not distinguish ¶ between the civil and the military: everywhere where irreversible apparatuses of control ¶ are elaborated, everywhere where the notion of security becomes omnipotent, ¶ everywhere where the norm replaces the old arsenal of laws and violence (including ¶ war), it is the system of deterrence that grows, and around it grows the historical, social, ¶ and political desert. A gigantic involution that makes every conflict, every finality, every ¶ confrontation contract in proportion to this blackmail that interrupts, neutralizes, freezes ¶ them all. No longer can any revolt, any story be deployed according to its own logic ¶ because it risks annihilation. No strategy is possible any longer, and escalation is only a ¶ puerile game given over to the military. The political stake is dead, only simulacra of ¶ conflicts and carefully circumscribed stakes remain.

# 2NC

## A2: Owen

he thinks that focus on political relevance causes bad epistemology which must be questioned

Owen 2 (professor of social and political philosophy at the University of Southampton, PhD from Durham University, 2002, “Reorienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Practical Reasoning,” published in the Millennium Journal of International Studies, Volume 31, Number 3) GZ

The first dimension concerns the relationship between positivist IR theory and postmodernist IR ‘theory’ (and the examples illustrate the claims concerning pluralism and factionalism made in the introduction to this section). It is exhibited when we read Walt warning of the danger of postmodernism as a kind of theoretical decadence since ‘issues of peace and war are too important for the field [of IR] to be diverted into a prolix and self-indulgent discourse that is divorced from the real world’,12 or find Keohane asserting sniffily that Neither neorealist nor neoliberal institutionalists are content with interpreting texts: both sets of theorists believe that there is an international political reality that can be partly understood, even if it will always remain to some extent veiled.13 We should be wary of such denunciations precisely because the issue at stake for the practitioners of this ‘prolix and self-indulgent discourse’ is the picturing of international politics and the implications of this picturing for the epistemic and ethical framing of the discipline, namely, the constitution of what phenomena are appropriate objects of theoretical or other forms of enquiry. The kind of accounts provided by practitioners of this type are not competing theories (hence Keohane’s complaint) but conceptual reproblematisations of the background that informs theory construction, namely, the distinctions, concepts, assumptions, inferences and assertability warrants that are taken for granted in the course of the debate between, for example, neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists (hence the point-missing character of Keohane’s complaint). Thus, for example, Michael Shapiro writes: The global system of sovereign states has been familiar both structurally and symbolically in the daily acts of imagination through which space and human identity are construed. The persistence of this international imaginary has helped to support the political privilege of sovereignty affiliations and territorialities. In recent years, however, a variety of disciplines have offered conceptualizations that challenge the familiar, bordered world of the discourse of international relations.14 The point of these remarks is to call critically into question the background picture (or, to use another term of art, the horizon) against which the disciplinary discourse and practices of IR are conducted in order to make this background itself an object of reflection and evaluation. In a similar vein, Rob Walker argues: Under the present circumstances the question ‘What is to be done?’ invites a degree of arrogance that is all too visible in the behaviour of the dominant political forces of our time. . . . The most pressing questions of the age call not only for concrete policy options to be offered to existing elites and institutions, but also, and more crucially, for a serious rethinking of the ways in which it is possible for human beings to live together.15 The aim of these comments is to draw to our attention the easily forgotten fact that our existing ways of picturing international politics emerge from, and in relation to, the very practices of international politics with which they are engaged and it is entirely plausible (on standard Humean grounds) that, under changing conditions of political activity, these ways of guiding reflection and action may lose their epistemic and/or ethical value such that a deeper interrogation of the terms of international politics is required. Whether or not one agrees with Walker that this is currently required, it is a perfectly reasonable issue to raise. After all, as Quentin Skinner has recently reminded us, it is remarkably difficult to avoid falling under the spell of our own intellectual heritage. . . . As we analyse and reflect on our normative concepts, it is easy to become bewitched into believing that the ways of thinking about them bequeathed to us by the mainstream of our intellectual traditions must be the ways of thinking about them.16 In this respect, one effect of the kind of challenge posed by postmodernists like Michael Shapiro and Rob Walker is to prevent us from becoming too readily bewitched.

## Framework

Situatedness determines political efficacy

Dillon 99 (Michael Dillon, professor of politics at the University of Lancaster, 1999, “Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics,” pp 97-8)

Heirs to all this, we find ourselves in the turbulent and now globalized wake of its confluence. As Heidegger-himself an especially revealing figure of the deep and mutual implication of the philosophical and the political4-never tired of pointing out, the relevance of ontology to all other kinds of thinking is fundamental and inescapable. For one cannot say anything about anything that is, without always already having made assumptions about the is as such. Any mode of thought, in short, always already carries an ontology sequestered within it. What this ontological turn does to other regional modes of thought is to challenge the ontology within which they operate. The implications of that review reverberate throughout the entire mode of thought, demanding a reappraisal as fundamental as the reappraisal ontology has demanded of philosophy. With ontology at issue, the entire foundations or underpinnings of any mode of thought are rendered problematic. This applies as much to any modern discipline of thought as it does to the question of modernity as such, with the exception, it seems, of science, which, having long ago given up the ontological questioning of when it called itself natural philosophy, appears now, in its industrialized and corporatized form, to be invulnerable to ontological perturbation. With its foundations at issue, the very authority of a mode of thought and the ways in which it characterizes the critical issues of freedom and judgment (of what kind of universe human beings inhabit, how they inhabit it, and what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it) is also put in question. The very ways in which Nietzsche, Heidegger, and other continental philosophers challenged Western ontology, simultaneously, therefore reposed the fundamental and inescapable difficulty, or aporia, for human being of decision and judgment. In other words, whatever ontology you subscribe to, knowingly or unknowingly, as a human being you still have to act. Whether or not you know or acknowledge it, the ontology you subscribe to will construe the problem of action for you in one way rather than another. You may think ontology is some arcane question of philosophy, but Nietzsche and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes not only a way of thinking, but a way of being, a form of life. Decision, a fortiori political decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of being that bears an understanding of Being, and of the fundaments of the human way of being within it. This applies, indeed applies most, to those mock innocent political slaves who claim only to be technocrats of decision making.

4. Their framework causes passivity

Antonio 95 (Robert J Antonio, PhD in sociology, professor of sociology at the University of Kansas, July 1995, “Nietzsche’s Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History,” *American Journal of Sociology* Volume 101 Number 1, GENDER MODIFIED)

According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass disci- pline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, ef- fecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, ap- pearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "re- markable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83).¶ The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw dif- ferentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrica- tions to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of oth- ers, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devas- tating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integ- rity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor?¶ A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring net- works of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others."¶ Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most medio- cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra- tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors am- plify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, ex- ploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir- cumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great ~~man~~ [person] of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more ur- gently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).

**Framing determines the outcomes of policy – uniquely true in the context of security**

**Calkivik 10** (Emine Asli Calkivik, PhD in political science from the University of Minnesota, October 2010, “Dismantling Security,” <http://purl.umn.edu/99479>) gz

In contrast to traditional approaches to security, which assume an objective¶ world that operates according to ahistorical formal models and rely on a statist¶ political ontology that naturalizes the meaning of what security is and how it can be¶ achieved,120 critical approaches attend to the relations of power that structure the¶ production of in/securities and expose the processes by which national identities and¶ what are deemed as a danger to those identities are constructed. A common point¶ shared by these engagements is their emphasis on the ethical dimension of scholarly¶ inquiry as well as the recognition that knowledge claims are always embedded in¶ relations of power. Their emphasis on the “ought” rather than the “is” reflects less a¶ reworking of the hierarchy between material and ideational power than an emphasis¶ on the social nature of global politics and an understanding that all phenomenon¶ pertaining to international relations exists through the cultural and ideological¶ structures through which they are given meaning and legitimated.121¶ Definition and construction of threats and the way in which states respond to¶ those threats constitutes one of the primary items on the agenda of critical scholars.122¶ While conventional analyses of security conceive threats as arising from material¶ capabilities of sovereign states located in a self-help system, critical approaches point¶ to the ways in which threats and intentions are not objectively given but socially¶ constructed: they involve history, culture, and power relations that cannot be reduced¶ to an objective measure of military capabilities. They investigate the ways in which¶ systems of signification and normative structures constrain or regulate collective¶ security practices or transform conduct in war. All of these studies reveal the¶ historically situated dynamics underlying practices that shape the desire to secure¶ bodies, nations, and states.¶ Primary examples of these engagements come from scholars working under¶ the broad banner of Constructivism.123 These scholars take as their premise the¶ proposition that interests and actions of states are socially constructed and therefore¶ subject to change. While leaving intact the traditional assumptions about military and¶ state-centric understandings of security, some of these studies nevertheless challenge¶ the traditional frameworks by explaining security practices through a recourse to¶ ideational elements such as norms and identities rather than relying on material¶ factors.124 In particular, these works challenge Neorealist and Neoliberal approaches,¶ which assume that states are rational, self-help actors in an anarchic environment. For¶ instance, Alexander Wendt in his seminal study shows how different (Hobbesian or¶ Kantian) anarchical cultures can play a role in channeling the security practices of¶ states on different paths.125 Focusing on international norms, such as the prohibitions¶ against the use of chemical and nuclear weapons or norms of humanitarian¶ intervention, other scholars argue that questions about international security cannot be¶ answered by Realist materialist explanations alone.126 An example to these¶ investigations is provided by Risse-Kappen, who argues that NATO’s post-Cold War¶ survival can only be explained with reference to ideational factors such as values and¶ identity—in this case, democratic, liberal values—that guarantee the institution’s¶ survival in the absence of a distinct threat.127¶ The post-Cold War security environment and proliferating threat discourses in¶ the absence of the “Soviet enemy” provide ample resource for scholars who focus on¶ the representational practices that played role in the construction of threats to state¶ security. For instance, Mutimer examines in detail the linguistic and metaphorical¶ construction of threats to the United States and its allies through the “image of¶ proliferation.”128 He points out the way in which a particular discursive framing of a¶ problem—in this case, the construction of the use of chemical or biological weapons¶ as a problem of proliferation as opposed to a problem of disarmament—shapes the¶ constitution of identities and interests of the actors in question and gives way to¶ particular patterns of foreign policy.¶ The discourse of threats and their social production—as well as the¶ construction of the objects of security as an inextricable aspect of security¶ discourses—constitutes an important item on the agenda of critical investigations.129¶ In conventional analyses, the purported state of nature populated by instrumentally¶ rational actors is taken as the departure point of analysis. Within this framework, the¶ state acts as the primary source of authority, the guarantor of order, and the primary¶ protector of the values and interests of these individuals. While the state is rendered¶ the locus of security, security of the state gets equated to the security of the citizen. In¶ contrast to the positing of the state as the locus of security with a neutrally given¶ interest of survival, critical scholars argue that a concept like national security needs to¶ be understood as a social construction rather than an objectively given fact. For¶ instance, in her case study of the Cuban missile crisis, Jutta Weldes shows how a core¶ concept such as the national interest is discursively constituted through¶ representational practices and linguistic elements.130 Other investigations explore the¶ working of security as a political practice, or the processes of construction of threats¶ through institutional mobilization and knowledge production. Some of these scholars¶ use “speech-act theory” to study how utterances of security constitute certain issues as¶ security problems.131¶ A related line of analysis, conducted mostly from post-structural and postcolonial¶ perspectives, is to trace the operation of power in its various guises and to¶ map the hierarchical relations, highlighting the gaps and silences of hegemonic¶ security narratives. In his Writing Security, David Campbell investigates how certain¶ risks are interpreted as dangers, what power effects these interpretative articulations¶ produce, and how they police the boundaries of the political community and produce¶ obedient subjects.132 Going against the grain of state-centric, strategic accounts of war,¶ scholars such as Michael Shapiro bring to focus the role of political violence in the¶ construction of the geopolitical imaginary and the production/ affirmation of collective¶ identity.133 Others focus on the international interventions that took place during the¶ 1990s and discuss the ways in which these imperial investments are legitimated by the¶ West through a moral discourse based on universal values.134¶ Other studies lay bare the historical biases, Eurocentric assumptions, and¶ racialized or gendered content of conceptions, analyses, theories, and practices of¶ security. Attending to the power of representation, they expose the links between¶ economies of power and “truth” in the re/production of international hierarchies and¶ in/securities. Problematizing the representation of post-colonial states as “failed” or¶ lacking, and hence as a major threat to international security, some of these scholars¶ demonstrate how these so-called failures were precisely the products of unequal¶ encounters with Western colonialism, pointing out the ways in which these¶ hierarchical relations were being reproduced through ongoing unequal economic,¶ social, and military relations.135 They analyze the construction of the non-Western¶ subject as the inferior other—“the Southern” or “the Oriental”—and attend to the¶ ways in which these representations are mobilized to legitimate certain security¶ practices and policies such as nuclear proliferation in the Third World.136 Introducing¶ feminist perspectives into their analyses, other scholars expose the gender biases¶ imbued in security practices, problematizing state security for rendering violence and¶ insecurity from the perspective of women.137

## A2: Perm

**Footnoting DA**

**Der Derian 95** (James, Professor of Political Science – University of Massachusetts, International Theory: Critical Investigations, p. 374)

But what happens - as seems to be the case to this observer - when the 'we' fragments, 'realism' takes on prefixes and goes plural, the meaning of meaning itself is up for grabs? A stop-gap solution is to supplement the definitional gambit with a facile gesture. The IR theorist, mindful of a creeping pluralism, will note the 'essentially contested' nature of realism - duly backed up with a footnote to W. B. Gallie or W E. Connolly - and then get down to business as usual, that is, using realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon. This amounts to an intellectual plea of nolo-contendere: in exchange for not contesting the charge that the meaning of realism is contestable, the IR 'perp' gets off easy, to then turn around and commit worse epistemological crimes. In honor of the most notorious benefactor of nolo-contendere in recent American legal history, we might call this the 'Spiro-ette effect' in International Relations.

**Sequencing DA**

**Burke 7** (Anthony, lecturer at Adelaide University School of History and Politics, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence: *War against the Other*, p. 31)

<This chapter remains focused on the aporias that lie at the heart of security, rather than pushing into the spaces that potentially lie beyond. This is another project, one whose contours are already becoming clearer and which I address in detail in Chapters 2 and 3.16 What this chapter builds is a genealogical account of security's origins and cultural power, its ability to provide what Walker calls a 'constitutive account of the political’ – as he says, 'claims about common security, collective security, or world security do little more than fudge the contradictions written into the heart of modern politics: we can only become humans, or anything else, after we have given up our humanity, or any other attachments, to the greater good of citizenship'.17 Before we can rewrite security we have to properly understand how security has written us – how it has shaped and limited our very possibility, the possibilities for our selves, our relationships and our available images of political, social and economic order. This, as Walker intriguingly hints, is also to explore the aporetic distance that modernity establishes between our 'humanity' and a secure identity defined and limited by the state. In short, security needs to be placed alongside a range of other economic, political, technological, philosophic and scientific developments as one of the central constitutive events of our modernity, and it remains one of its essential underpinnings.>

**The permutation engages security through a political telos – blocks off critique**

**Burke 7** (Anthony, lecturer at Adelaide University School of History and Politics, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 3-4)

These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on terror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1 It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis relate not only to the most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, but also to their available (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, but also their mainstream critiques - whether they take the form of liberal policy approaches in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement about major concepts, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity. As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically wards off critique.

## Link

**Their so called benign hegemonic strategy legitimizes a series of self-fulfilling prophecies in which any nation that steps outside of the globalized order is destroyed**

SAMIR **AMIN** director of the African office (in Dakar, Senegal) of the Third World Forum, an international nongovernmental association for research and debate, and chair of the World Forum for Alternatives. He is the author of numerous books and articles including Beyond U.S. Hegemony 25 FEB **2003** (“The Alternative to the neoliberal system of globalization and militarism Imperialism Today and the Hegemonic Offensive of the United States.”)

28. The hegemonic strategy of the United States is articulated on the collective character of new imperialism and to the profit of the insufficiencies and weaknesses of the “antineoliberal” social and political movements. 29. This strategy, barely recognized by the “proAmerican” defenders, is, in the dominant discourse, the object of two “soft” propositions, not quite real, but operational, from the point of view of our opponent. The first is that this hegemony belongs to a “gentle” leadership, sometimes knows as “benign hegemony” by the democratic fraction of the American establishment. Through this mix of false naivety and real hypocrisy, this discourse pretends that the United States only acts in the interests of the peoples who are associated with the triad,

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motivated by the same “democratic” pulses, and even the interests of the rest of the world, to whom globalization offers the chance of “development”, reinforced by the benefits of democracy that American powers promote everywhere, as we know. The second is that, in all domains, the Unites States benefit from enormous advantages  whether it be economic, scientific, political, military or cultural that legitimize their hegemony. In fact, American hegemony works from logic, and a system, that has little to do with the discourse it envelops. 30. The objectives of this hegemony have been proclaimed, and adhered to in innumerable productions from the US leaders (unfortunately, little read by its victims). After the fall of the USSR  their only potential military adversary  the US establishment evaluates that it has a period of about 20 years to put into place its global hegemony and reduce to nothingness the possibilities of its potential “rivals”, not that they are necessarily capable of an alternative hegemony, just capable of affirming their autonomy in a global system that would be “nonhegemonic”  in my language, a multicentric system. These “rivals” are of course Europe (we no longer hear talks about a Japan hegemony !), but also Russia and most of all China, the principal designated adversary that Washington may have to envision destroying (militarily) if she continues to persist in her “development” and a certain independent will. Other rivals have also been noted, in fact, all Southern countries that may develop a resistance to the exigencies of globalized neoliberalism  India or Brazil, Iran or South Africa. 31. The objectives are therefore to vassalize the allies in the triad, to make them incapable of effective global initiatives, and to destroy the “large countries”, always by nature too “big” (the United States being the only one with right to be so). Dismantle Russia after the USSR, dismantle China, India, even Brazil; instrumentalising the weaknesses of each country’s power systems, manipulate the former States of the USSR, and stroke the centrifugal forces in the Russian Federation, support the Muslims of Xinjiang and the Tibetan monks, feeding the conflict with the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent, intervening in the Amazon (Plan Colombia), etc.

Their MercoPress evidence describes the absence of war as a “peaceful solution”

**Cuomo 96** – PhD, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati (Chris, Hypatia Fall 1996. Vol. 11, Issue 3, pg 30)

In "Gender and `Postmodern' War," Robin Schott introduces some of the ways in which war is currently best seen not as an event but as a presence (Schott 1995). Schott argues that postmodern understandings of persons, states, and politics, as well as the high-tech nature of much contemporary warfare and the preponderance of civil and nationalist wars, render an eventbased conception of war inadequate, especially insofar as gender is taken into account. In this essay, I will expand upon her argument by showing that accounts of war that only focus on events are impoverished in a number of ways, and therefore feminist consideration of the political, ethical, and ontological dimensions of war and the possibilities for resistance demand a much more complicated approach. I take Schott's characterization of war as presence as a point of departure, though I am not committed to the idea that the constancy of militarism, the fact of its omnipresence in human experience, and the paucity of an event-based account of war are exclusive to contemporary postmodern or postcolonial circumstances.(1) Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and specificity of the everyday effects of militarism on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment. These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct gendered and national identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant presence of militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems. Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state. Moving away from crisis-driven politics and ontologies concerning war and military violence also enables consideration of relationships among seemingly disparate phenomena, and therefore can shape more nuanced theoretical and practical forms of resistance.

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For example, investigating the ways in which war is part of a presence allows consideration of the relationships among the events of war and the following: how militarism is a foundational trope in the social and political imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism of soldiers/warriors/patriots shape meanings of gender; the ways in which threats of state-sponsored violence are a sometimes invisible/sometimes bold agent of racism, nationalism, and corporate interests; the fact that vast numbers of communities, cities, and nations are currently in the midst of excruciatingly violent circumstances. It also provides a lens for considering the relationships among the various kinds of violence that get labeled "war." Given current American obsessions with nationalism, guns, and militias, and growing hunger for the death penalty, prisons, and a more powerful police state, one cannot underestimate the need for philosophical and political attention to connections among phenomena like the "war on drugs," the "war on crime," and other state-funded militaristic campaigns. I propose that the constancy of militarism and its effects on social reality be reintroduced as a crucial locus of contemporary feminist attentions, and that feminists emphasize how wars are eruptions and manifestations of omnipresent militarism that is a product and tool of multiply oppressive, corporate, technocratic states.(2) Feminists should be particularly interested in making this shift because it better allows consideration of the effects of war and militarism on women, subjugated peoples, and environments. While giving attention to the constancy of militarism in contemporary life we need not neglect the importance of addressing the specific qualities of direct, large-scale, declared military conflicts. But the dramatic nature of declared, large-scale conflicts should not obfuscate the ways in which military violence pervades most societies in increasingly technologically sophisticated ways and the significance of military institutions and everyday practices in shaping reality. Philosophical discussions that focus only on the ethics of declaring and fighting wars miss these connections, and also miss the ways in which even declared military conflicts are often experienced as omnipresent horrors. These approaches also leave unquestioned tendencies to suspend or distort moral judgement in the face of what appears to be the inevitability of war and militarism.

## A2: Util

**Utilitarian calculability makes annihilation of everything inevitable**

**Dillon 99** – (Michael, professor of political science at the University of Lancaster, Political Theory, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Apr., 1999), pg 163- 164 jstor)

Otherness is born(e) within the self as an integral part of itself and in such a way that it always remains an inherent stranger to itself.33 It derives from the lack, absence, or ineradicable incompleteness which comes from having no security of tenure within or over that of which the self is a particular herme- neutical manifestation; namely, being itself. The point about the human, betrayed by this absence, is precisely that it is not sovereignly self-possessed and complete, enjoying undisputed tenure in and of itself. Modes of justice therefore reliant upon such a subject lack the very foundations in the self that they most violently insist upon seeing inscribed there. This does not, how- ever, mean that the dissolution of the subject also entails the dissolution of Justice. Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ulti- mately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism.34 They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability.35 Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logi- cally, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. How- ever liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the neces- sity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, "we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure."36 But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being.

## A2: No Root Cause

**Their no root cause arguments white out colonialism – separating conditions for violence is an attempt to make them more invisible – the impact is extinction**

**Nhanenge 07** (Jytte Nhanenge, MA in development studies at the University of South Africa, February 2007, “Ecofeminism: Towards Integrating the Concerns of Women, Poor People, and Nature into Development,” page 90-1)

The four crises are difficult to resolve individually because they are interlinked and they therefore reinforce each other. Wars usually give the effect of poverty, environmental damage and repression. Poverty often results in environmental damage and can lead to revolts and repression. Destruction of nature causes poverty, social upheaval and repression. Abuses of human's rights are entangled in all of the other crises. In addition and paradoxically, mainstream development activities, meant to ameliorate poverty in the South, often also lead to environmental damage, human's rights abuses, increased poverty and violence. Thus, the four crises function in a web-like fashion and are difficult to ameliorate individually. Should positive changes be made it is necessary to look beyond a treatment of each crisis towards a more fundamental process of overall healing. Hence, the crises may more correctly be seen as a symptom of a more fundamental systemic "dis-ease". (Ekins 1992: 13). Hazel Henderson (Capra 1989: 248) agrees with Ekins. The major problems of our time cannot be understood in isolation. Whether a crisis manifests itself as poverty, environmental degradation, war or human rights abuses does not matter. The underlying dynamics are the same. Thus, the crises are interconnected, interdependent and all are rooted in a larger systemic crisis. Each crisis is therefore only a different aspect of the same crisis: a crisis of perception. It derives from the fact that the Western world subscribes to an outdated, reductionist world-view. Modern science, technology, government structures, development agencies and academic institutions are all using a fragmented methodology, which has proven to be inadequate in dealing with a systemically interconnected world. Thus, many scientifically educated people cannot understand and hence resolve systemic crises. Most leaders also fail to see that the problems are inter-linked. They therefore cannot recognize that their preferred reductionist economic solutions have disastrous consequences elsewhere in the social and natural system. The main aim for politicians, economists and development experts is to maximize economic growth, but they cannot perceive that this negatively affects women, Others, nature and future generations. (Capra 1982: 6; Capra 1997: 3-4). 2.6.1. Modernity; a reductionist perception of realityRichard B. Norgaard has arrived at a similar conclusion in his book "Development betrayed; the end of progress and a coevolutionary revisioning of the future". He argues that the reasons behind the environmental crises relates to the Western philosophy of life. A good life is seen to be modern and progressive. Modernity promised that humanity with its superior science could control nature that all could have material abundance through scientific technology and that life could be administered effectively by rational social organisation. The combination would lead to peace on Earth where all would be part of the new, collective, modern culture. However, modernity betrayed development. Instead of unity, it led to material madness, inequalities, depletion of natural resources, degradation of the environment, increase in number of wars and refugees and a bureaucratic deadlock where governments cannot find rational solutions to the crises. (Norgaard 1994: 1-2). The problem is that modernism is based on some false beliefs about scientific technology, social structure and environmental interaction. It is assumed that progress will come about as a linear process. Thus improved science will promote improved technology, which leads to better rational social organisation, and increased material well-being. This is perceived as an eternal activity, all determined by science. However, such a view is too simple. Progress cannot continue forever since the means, our natural resources, are finite. We do not have an eternal source of energy, with which economists seem to calculate. Thus in the name of progress we are depleting our natural resources and destroying the planet Earth. In the end, modernity's progress will terminate our existence. (Norgaard 1994: 32-34, 54-56). More fundamentally, the crises relate to the philosophical premises underlying the Western metaphysical and epistemological world-view. Norgaard (1994: 62) calls them for atomism, mechanism, universalism, objectivism and monism. In brief, they translate reality as follows: Systems (for example social or natural ones) consist of unchanging parts, the sum of which equals the whole. The relationship between the parts is fixed and possible changes are reversible. Although systems may be diverse and complex, they all are based on a limited number of underlying universal laws, which are unchanging and eternal. These laws can be understood by observing the systems from the outside. The knowledge derived at is objective and universal. Hence, this is the only one way to understand systems. When a system's laws are known, its actions can be predicted and the system can be controlled. In this way, the system can be manipulated to benefit human beings. (Norgaard 1994: 6266).

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## Oil

**You should be skeptical of their truth claims – apocalyptic environmental discourse causes scapegoating and resource exploitation which makes violence inevitable**

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“The Dilemma should by now be apparent; securitising environmental issues runs the risk that the strategic/realist approach will coopt and colonise the environmental agenda rather than respond positively to environmental problems.” (Barnett 2001:137) The realist take on ‘security’ in the post-WWII period still holds a firm grasp today, so that the state is still the referent object of security and it is still its sovereignty which is to be secured against the threat of states. The problem is that, in the context of the environment, this makes no sense because the traditional focus of national security (interstate violence) has nothing to do with the focus of environmental degradation (human impact on the environment). Furthermore, talking of national security is too restrictive because a state’s ecological footprint may cross its sovereign domain. The wealthiest 20% of the world’s population consume 84% of all paper, use 87% of the world’s vehicles and emit 53% of all C0². Yet those least responsible suffer the effects the most. This is because wastes are exported to and resources come from the Southern poorer countries, so that their lands experience resource depletion and extraction (Barnett 2001:13). A focus on national security selects the military, because environmental degradation is viewed as having the potential to destabilise regional balances of power (Hough 2004:13-16). One only wonders how the military alone could prevent the effects of depletion and extraction. The environmental-conflict literature is a good example where traditional national security concerns have been linked with the environment. The narrative within this discourse is that environment degradation will lead to resource scarcities, which will make the developing countries more militarily confrontational towards the industrialised states (Barnett 2001:38). Conflict over scarce resources undermines the security of the state (Detraz and Betsill 2009:305), so it is the state which is to be protected. Emphasis on such an account is undesirable for many reasons. Firstly, it is untrue that the only consequence of environmental degradation is conflict. Bogardi and Brauch have noted how environmental security involves freedom from want (economic and social security dimensions), freedom from hazard impacts (natural or human-induced hazards as effects of environmental degradation) and freedom from fear (violence and conflict)(Brauch 2008: 17-8). This demonstrates how conflict is but one consequence of degradation. Environmental-conflict literature ignores the root socioeconomic causes and hazard impact dimensions of environmental security; a focus on which would lead to conclusions of undertaking non-military efforts like disaster preparedness, adaptation, mitigation, early warning systems etc (Brauch 2008:17-8), and economic solutions like pricing goods to reflect the costs of their provision (Mathews (1989:172). Secondly, the assertion that environmental degradation is a primary reason of conflict is purely speculative (Barnett 2003:10). Barnett suggests that the ‘evidence’ provided in support is a collection of historical events chosen to support the conflict-scarcity storyline and reify the realist assumption that eventually humans will resort to violence (Barnett 2001:66). This is as opposed to acknowledging that humans are equally capable of adapting. Thirdly, research shows that it is abundance of resources which drives competition, not scarcity (Barnet 2003:11). This makes sense because any territorial conquest to obtain resources will be expensive. A poor country suffering from resource scarcity would not be able to afford an offensive war(Deudney 1990: 309-11). The second and third points mean that environmental-conflict literature counteracts any attempts at solving the problem of environmental degradation. The discourse attributes high intentionality to people-because of scarcity they decide to become violent. This ignores the fact that human actions are not intended to harm the environment. The high intentionality given to people prevents them from being seen as victims who need help. Instead they are pictured as threats to state security. This view can exacerbate ethnic tensions as the state uses minority groups as scapegoats for environmental degradation. It also means that only those involved in conflict are relevant to environmental security, not those who are vulnerable (Detraz and Betsill 2009:307-15). In this way the South is scripted as “primeval Other” (Barnett 2001:65), where order can only be maintained by the intervention of the North, rather than by the provision of aid. The North’s agency in creating the environmental problems is completely erased. Instead environmental degradation is seen from the perspective of the individual state, questioning how it could affect the state, i.e. increased migration (Allenby 2000:18) and this leads to the adoption of narrow policies. Saad has said that securitising the environment in this way allows the North to justify intervening and forcing developing nations to follow policies which encapsulate the North’s norms (Saad 1991:325-7). In this way the powerful become stronger, and the weak weaker. This view may affect the South’s relations with the North. For example, Detraz and Betsill have commented on tensions between the North and South in the 2007 United Nations Security Council debate on climate change. Only 29% of the Southern states compared to 70% of Northern speakers supported the idea of the Security Council being a place to develop a global response to climate change. The reasons for this difference was that shifting decision-making to the Security Council would make Southern states unable to promote efficiently their interests in obtaining resources for climate adaptation and mitigation plans. Furthermore, Egypt and India argued that in suggesting this Northern countries were avoiding their responsibilities for controlling greenhouse gases, by trying to “shift attention to the need to address potential climate-related conflict in the South” (Detraz and Betsill 2009:312). In this way environmental security becomes a barrier because the traditional (realist) concept of security is used to immobilise any action towards dealing with the root causes of environmental degradation.

Cuban embargo protects the Cuban environment – prevents Cuba from harmful oil drilling

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Mauricio, “How the Cuban embargo protects the environment”, AP

<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/25/opinion/25iht-edcarone.1.14793496.html>

The energy debate in the United States introduces one more powerful argument in support of current U.S. policy toward Cuba: environmental protection.¶ ¶ For years the Castro brothers have been courting foreign oil companies, and in recent years none have been courted more assiduously than China's Sinopec. Why Sinopec?¶ ¶ The answer is simple: If the Chinese were to start drilling in the Gulf of Mexico off the coast of Cuba - so very close to the coast of Florida - it would send a "red scare" through the halls of the U.S. Congress, creating a new and otherwise improbable coalition for unilaterally lifting the current embargo. Longtime advocates of lifting trade sanctions against Cuba would join with conservative Republicans, who, though they now support the trade embargo, are strong advocates for allowing U.S. companies to drill offshore, and with liberal environmentalists who would rather have strictly regulated U.S. companies drilling than unregulated Chinese companies. In Cuba that looks like a winning trifecta for changing U.S. policy.¶ ¶ As early as 2006, the Reuters news bureau in Cuba was reporting: "Havana is eager to see American oil companies join forces with the anti-embargo lobby led by U.S. farmers who have been selling food to Cuba for four years."¶ ¶ In recent weeks this strategy has taken center stage in Washington with political and public opinion leaders openly discussing the irony of "the Chinese drilling 60 miles from Florida's coast," while U.S. law prevents American companies from doing the same along the outer continental shelf.¶ ¶ The premise of the argument, however, is just not true. Chinese companies are not drilling in Cuba's offshore waters. Nor do the Chinese have any lease agreements with Cuba's state-owned oil company, Cupet, to do so. As a matter of fact, the last drilling for oil off Cuba's coast took place in 2004 and was led by the Spanish-Argentine consortium Repsol YPF. It found oil but not in any commercially viable quantity. Inactivity since suggests that Repsol YPF is not eager to follow up with the required investment in Castro's Cupet.¶ ¶ For almost a decade now, the Castro regime has been lauding offshore lease agreements. It has tried Norway's StatoilHydro, India's state-run Oil & Natural Gas Corporation, Malaysia's Petronas and Canada's Sherritt International. Yet, there is no current drilling activity off Cuba's coasts. The Cuban government has announced plans to drill, then followed with postponements in 2006, 2007 and this year.¶ ¶ Clearly, foreign oil companies anticipate political changes in Cuba and are trying to position themselves accordingly. It is equally clear they are encountering legal and logistical obstacles preventing oil and gas exploration and development. Among the impediments are well-founded reservations as to how any new discovery can be turned into product. Cuba has very limited refining capacity, and the U.S. embargo prevents sending Cuban crude oil to American refineries. Neither is it financially or logistically viable for partners of the current Cuban regime to undertake deep-water exploration without access to U.S. technology, which the embargo prohibits transferring to Cuba. The **prohibitions exist for good reason**. Fidel Castro expropriated U.S. oil company assets after taking control of Cuba and has never provided compensation.¶ ¶ Equally important, foreign companies trying to do business with Cuba still face a lot of expenses and political risks. If, or when, the Cuban regime decides again to expropriate the assets of these companies, there is no legal recourse in Cuba.¶ ¶ Frankly, it is bewildering why some seem to believe that U.S. companies partnering with one more anti-American dictatorship to explore and develop oil fields will somehow reduce fuel costs for American consumers and contribute to U.S. energy independence. One needs only to look at the reaction of the international oil markets when Hugo Chávez of Venezuela nationalized assets of U.S.-based ConocoPhillips and Chevron.¶ ¶ What message would the United States be sending to oil-rich, tyrannical regimes around the world about the consequences of expropriation if we were now to lift the embargo that was imposed after Fidel Castro expropriated the assets of Esso, Shell and Texaco?¶ ¶ For many years the U.S. embargo has served to protect America's national security interests; today it is also serving to prevent Cuba's regime from drilling near U.S. shores. And **that's good for the environment**.

## Relations

**The characterization of China has a threat robs it of subjectivity and entrenches its role as antithesis to the US**

**Pan 04** – PhD in Political Science and International Relations and member of the International Studies Association ISA (Chengxin Pan: Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 29 Pg. 305 -307)

By now, it seems clear thatneither China's capabilities nor intentions really matter. Rather, almost by its mere geographical existence, China has been qualified as an absolute strategic "other," a discursive construct from which it cannot escape. Because of this, "China" in U.S. IR discourse has been objectified and deprived of its own subjectivity and exists mainly in and for the U.S.self. Little wonder that for many U.S. China specialists,China becomes merely a "national security concern" for the United States, with the "severe disproportion between the keen attention to China as a security concern and the intractable neglect of China's [own] security con­cerns in the current debate."62 At this point, at issue here is no longer whether the "China threat" argument is true or false, but is rather its reflection of a shared positivist mentality among mainstream China expertsthat they know China better than do the Chinese themselves. "We" alone can know for sure that they consider "us" their enemy and thus pose a menace to "us." Such an account of China, in many ways, strongly seems to resemble Orientalists' problematic distinc­tionbetween the West and the Orient. Like orientalism, theU.S. construction of the Chinese "other" does not require that China acknowledge the validity of that dichotomous construction. Indeed, as Edward Said points out, "It is enough for 'us' to set up these distinctions in our own minds; [and] 'they' become 'they' accordingly. "64

**China threats are products of narcissistic understandings of the U.S.’s role in global politics – it results in containment which un-brackets war**

**Pan 04’** – PhD in Political Science and International Relations and member of the International Studies Association ISA (Chengxin Pan: Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 29 Pg. 305 -307)

I have argued above that the "China threat" argument in main­stream U.S. IR literature is derived, primarily, from a discursive construction of otherness. This construction is predicated on a particular narcissistic understanding of the U.S. self and on a posi­tivist-based realism, concerned with absolute certainty and security, a concern central to the dominant U.S. self-imaginary. Within these frameworks,it seems imperative that China be treated as a threatening, absolute other since it is unable to fit neatly into the U.S.-led evolutionary scheme or guarantee absolute security for the United States, so that U.S. power preponderanc**e** in the post–Cold War world can still be legitimated. Not only does this reductionist representation come at the expense of understanding China as a dynamic, multifaceted coun­try but it leads inevitably to a policy of containment that, in turn, tends to enhance the influence of realpolitik thinking, nationalist extremism, andhard-line stance in today's China. Even a small dose of the containment strategy is likely to have a highly dramatic impact on U.S.-China relations**,** as the 1995-1996 missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident have vividly attested. In this respect, Chalmers Johnson is right when he suggests that "a policy of con­tainment toward China implies the possibility of war, just as it did during the Cold War vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union. The balance of terror prevented war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but this may not work in the case of China."93